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Abstract 
Contracts and organizational controls to monitor contract compliance are important 
tools to enhance trust in a fair business transaction in network organisations and 
electronic commerce in general. In this paper, we propose a design methodology for such 
contracts and supporting controls, utilizing inter-organisational value models. We argue 
that a framework for designing control mechanisms should include three steps: design of 
an inter-organizational value model, analysis of possible violations of contractual 
obligations underlying this value model, and design of control mechanisms to detect or 
prevent such violations. It is shown how the e3-value methodology, which was developed 
to design business value models, can be extended to model obligations of parties. We use 
concepts and ideas from deontic logic (the logic of obligations and permissions) to 
develop an extension of e3-value called e3-value+. The e3-value+ approach is a design 
tool for modelling violations of obligations and control mechanisms to prevent and 
correct these violations, which can be used in contract drafting and contingency planning 
for inter-organisational collaboration in network organisations. 
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1 Introduction 
One of the limitations for the success of electronic commerce is the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour by legal entities (McKnight1998). For example, parties may not deliver 
products while they promised to do so, customers may not pay for delivered products, or 
others may commit frauds. Consequently, since transacting parties often do not know 
each other, sufficient trust enhancing facilities should be in place to facilitate trading.  
Technical means, such as encryption technology and digital signatures to build trust-
facilitating services are available right now. Additionally, current research topics in 
computer science such as ‘web services’ and ‘peer-to-peer networking’ enable the 
provisioning of inter-organisational business processes, required for trust enhancing 
procedures (Foster et. al. 2002, Barkai 2001). Finally, contracts and organizational 
controls to monitor contract compliance are required to improve trust. In traditional 
commerce, control mechanisms have already being studied extensively (Anthony and 
Govindarjan 2003, Vassen 2002), such as contractual obligations and formal 
organisational mechanisms for co-operation. For e-commerce cases however, the design 
of control mechanism is a rather uncharted territory. 
For example, although, technically speaking, an electronic signature is much more 
reliable than a hand-written signature, the historically proven “paper and pen” way of 
signing a contract is considered by human beings to be more reliable. One can say that the 
reason is because a paper contract is backed with a proven infrastructure of legislative 
practices and underlying control mechanisms that make it possible to solve any 
disagreement between parties. Many research of the Transaction Cost economy (TCE) 
school (Williamson 1985) agree that governance mechanisms, such as control 
mechanisms, reduce the risk of opportunistic behaviour, and, consequently, increase the 
success of inter-organisational co-operation. We claim that control mechanisms are an 
essential part of an electronic commerce infrastructure. However, what is lacking is an 
understanding how to design contracts and supporting control mechanisms on top of such 
technical possibilities. 
A contract can be seen as a control mechanism that can ensure legality and protect the 
interests of all parties involved in electronic commerce. Technology biased-research on 
electronic contracting (Ludwig and Stolze 2003) assumes that a plain textual, natural 
language representation of the contractual content that can be read and interpreted by 
business people and lawyers suffices all requirements. However, business studies (Luo 
2001) indicate incomplete contracting practices that result in increased opportunism and 
failure of inter-organisational co-operation. The design of a contract suitable for 
electronic commerce as well as its supporting controls, is a multi-disciplinary task that 
requires solutions for incomplete contracting practises. It involves obviously legal 
aspects, but also computer science issues are relevant (many controls take the form of 
computer software), as well as inter-organisational business process design (many 
contracts say how, and in which order, business transactions should be carried out, and by 
whom). In addition, in electronic commerce a thorough understanding of the 
corresponding business model is often lacking (Gordijn 2002), which can make 
contingency planning of contracts more complex.  
In (Daskalopulu and Sergot 1997, Tan and Thoen 2001) a need for contract negotiating 
and drafting methodology and tools is identified. The main contribution of this paper is 
that we propose a methodology for designing contracts and controls, based on an inter-
organizational business value model. The result is a framework for contingency planning 
in contracting. 
This paper is structured as follows. In section 2 two we propose an analytical framework 
to design control mechanisms. The framework consists of representing ideal and sub-
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ideal situations, and designing control mechanisms to prevent sub-ideal situations. We 
address the modelling of the ideal situation in section 3, and propose some ideas for 
modelling sub-ideal situations and control mechanisms in section 4.  
2 A Framework For Designing Control Mechanisms 
The main purpose of control mechanisms in electronic commerce would be to ensure that 
all value exchanges between enterprises take place as planned or stated in a contractual 
agreement. There are many theories dealing with control mechanisms. Main elements of 
every control system (Anthony and Govindarjan 2003, Vassen 2002) are the entity being 
controlled, detection of the violation, measurement of the severeness of the violation, and 
behaviour alteration. Similarly, control mechanisms can be seen as measures to prevent 
violation of obligations. Raskin et.al. (1996) distinguish two viewpoints on the behaviour 
of actors with regards to obligations: (1) no violation of obligations by the actor, which 
we call ideal behaviour, and (2) violation of obligations, which we call sub-ideal 
behaviour.  
A framework for designing control mechanisms should include at least the following 
subsequent steps: 
Design of a business value model (ideal situation) 
Analysis of contractual obligations and their possible violations (sub-ideal situation) 
Design of control mechanisms (prevention of sub-ideal situation) 
A business value model shows what actually is being controlled or governed by a 
contract. This is an essential element of every control system (Anthony and Govindarjan 
2003, Vassen 2002). In electronic commerce, such a value model is often unclear because 
most models are innovative. Consequently, it is necessary to understand the exchanges of 
economic valuable objects between actors before starting to design control mechanisms 
for these exchanges. We deliberately assume that a business value model only deals with 
ideal behaviour; that there is no violation of obligations. In practice, it is sufficiently 
difficult to design and understand such a model (Gordijn, 2003), and the addition of 
obligation issues would unnecessary complicate such a task. Therefore, we divide the 
design of a commercially sound value model from the analysis of violations and the 
design of control mechanisms. 
After it is understood what value exchanges actually have to be controlled, possible 
violations are analysed and control mechanisms are designed. According to the 
description of a control system in Anthony and Govindarjan (2003), it is necessary to 
measure what is going on in the process being controlled, and to determine the 
significance of what is happening. In our terms, before introducing control mechanisms, it 
is needed to know how the ideal situation can be violated, i.e. the sub-ideal situation has 
to be modelled, and what the severeness of the violation is. In the next two sections we 
address the modelling of ideal and sub-ideal situation in electronic commerce.  
3 The Ideal Situation: Value Models 
A first step in designing an electronic commerce case, is the development of a business 
value model, focusing on how value creation (Porter 1980, Stabell and Fjeldstad 1998), 
distribution and consumption happens in a network of actors (see (Pateli and Giaglis 
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2003) for an overview). We employ the e3-value methodology (Gordijn 2002, Gordijn 
and Akkermans 2003) for designing a business value model. 
The e3-value methodology of Gordijn (2001) allows for conceptualising a business value 
model by constructing a value model, representing it graphically in a rigorous and 
structured way, and performing a economic sensitivity analysis of the case at hand. In 
particular, the e3-value methodology provides modelling concepts for showing which 
parties exchange things of economic value with whom, and expect what in return. The 
methodology has been previously applied in a series of case studies including media, 
banking and insurance, and telecommunication companies (Gordijn and Akkermans 
2003) to design value models of network organisations. 
Most of the currently available design methodologies lack a value-based view stating 
what the value proposition is, rather they focus on business processes stating how a value 
proposition is implemented. There are a few value chain design methodologies, which 
provide concepts for describing vaue constellations. For example, the AIAI Enterprise 
conceptual framework (Uschold 1998) or the Resource Event Agent (REA) (Geerts and 
McCarthy 1999) conceptual framework. However, these frameworks only focus on the 
description of the final result, and do not support the value chain design process itself. 
Other business modelling methodologies (Alt and Zimmerman 2001, Osterwalder and 
Pigneur 2002, Petrovic et al. 2001) offer only generic conceptual frameworks, and lack 
the formality that is required for modelling for proper analysis. Tapscott et.al. (2000) 
offer a graphical diagramming approach to draw economic exchanges between 
enterprises, however, compared to e3-value, it has several drawbacks; e.g. it has no notion 
of economic activity, does not allow the profitability assessment of individual 




Figure 1: e3-Value Model Of A Purchase With Tax Payment 
 
We shortly describe the concepts of the e3-value methodology using a simple example. In 
Figure 1 a buyer obtains goods from a seller and offers money in return. According to 
law, the seller is obliged to pay the value-added tax (VAT). This is conceptualized by the 
following e3value constructs:  
Actor. An actor is perceived by its environment as an independent economic (and often 
legal) entity. An actor makes a profit or increases its utility. In a sound, sustainable, 
business model each actor should be capable of making profit. The example shows a 
number of actors: a buyer, a seller, and a tax administration. 
Value Object. Actors exchange value objects, which are services, products, money, or 
even consumer experiences. The important point here is that a value object is of value for 
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one or more actors. Good and payment are examples of value objects, but legal 
compliance to pay tax is also a value object. 
Value Port. An actor uses a value port to show to its environment that it wants to provide 
or request value objects. The concept of port enables to abstract away from the internal 
business processes, and to focus only on how external actors and other components of the 
business model can be ‘plugged in’.  
Value Interface. Actors have one or more value interfaces, grouping reciprocal, opposite-
directed value ports. A value interface shows the value object an actor is willing to 
exchange, in return for another value object via its ports. The exchange of value objects is 
atomic at the level of the value interface. 
Value Exchange. A value exchange is used to connect two value ports with each other. It 
represents one or more potential trades of value objects between value ports.  
With the concepts introduced so far, we can explain who wants to exchange values with 
whom, but we cannot yet explain what happens in response to a particular end-consumer 
need. For this purpose we include in the value model a representation of dependency 
paths (based on (Buhr 1998)) between value interfaces. A dependency path connects the 
value interfaces in an actor and represents triggering relations between these interfaces. A 
dependency path consists of dependency nodes and segments. 
Dependency node. A dependency node is a stimulus (represented by a bullet), a value 
interface, an AND-fork or AND-join (short line), an OR-fork or OR-join (triangle), or an 
end node (bull's eye). A stimulus represents a consumer need, an end node represents a 
model boundary. 
Dependency segment. A dependency segment connects dependency nodes and value 
interfaces. It is represented by a link.  
Dependency path. A dependency path is a set of dependency nodes and segments that 
leads from a start stimulus to an end stimulus. The meaning of the path is that if values 
are exchanged via a value interface, then other value interfaces connected by the path also 
exchange values. 
The advantage of e3-value is that it suggests a minimal number of concepts, which in 
practice leads to a usable modelling technique.  
It is important to understand that an e3-value model only models an ideal situation. The 
principle of reciprocity, defined in e3-value (Gordijn 2003) as the requirement that if an 
actor offers something of value to someone else, this actor always gets in return 
something what s/he wants, assumes that all actors behave correctly. The violation of the 
principle of reciprocity (e.g. an actor obtaining something without paying for it) can be 
seen as a violation of an obligation, which would lead to incorrect e3-value models with a 
value interface with only one incoming or outgoing value object, i.e. delivering goods and 
not receiving a payment in return. In the next section we extend e3-value with additional 
concepts and rules to be able to model such sub-ideal situations as violations of the 
principle of reciprocity.  
4 The Sub-Ideal Situation: Contractual Obligations And Controls 
A large number of theories about modelling obligations and their violations have been 
developed in the area of deontic logic (for an overview see Meyer and Wieringa 1993). In 
the research of (Raskin et.al. 1996, Tan and Thoen, 1998) a method was introduced to 
model obligations using Petri Nets. A Petri net is a graphical formalism for modelling and 
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analysing discrete dynamic systems. In Raskin et.al. (1996) it was suggested to model 
procedures and processes within and between organisations with extended Petri Nets, 
which model preference relations for different executions of transactions between actors.  
A method based on the one described in Raskin et al. can be used to extend e3-value in 
such a way that it becomes possible to represent obligations and violations of obligations. 
We will call this extension e3-value+. Violations of obligations in e3-value+ are modelled 
by so-called sub-ideal paths. These are typically paths for which the principle of 
reciprocity does not hold. For example, although in a contract it was agreed that the buyer 
would pay the seller in return for the delivery of the goods, there can be a sub-ideal path 
for which the seller did deliver the good, but the buyer does not pay within the agreed 
period of time. So, the first extension we have to make to the standard e3-value tool is that 
we omit the principle of reciprocity and allow for this type of sub-ideal paths. The second 
extension is that we add weights to the segments of a path. As in Raskin et.al. (1996), 
these weights represent a kind of fines. So, if a segment has a non-zero positive weight it 
reflects that this is a kind of sub-ideal behaviour that is fined with a penalty. A zero 
weight means that the segment does not violate the terms of the contract. 
Figure 1 shows an e3-value model, stating the ideal situation. In Figure 2 we use an e3-
value+ to model sub-ideal situations that can happen when one of the actors violates the 
contract (e.g. does not respect economic reciprocity). Modelling these sub-ideal paths are 
typical for contract drafting when the contract partners negotiate about the possible 
problems and contingencies that can occur during the execution of the contract and 
mutually agree on additional clauses to cover risks of non-performance of the other party. 
Typically, these extra contract clauses also include certain financial compensations, for 
example a reduction of the price if the goods are delivered too late. In organisational 
science research on contracting it has been observed that this reasoning about sub-ideal 
paths, which is called contingency planning, is one of the most important as well as 
labour intensive stages of contract negotiation. For example, in (McCauley 1963) it was 
observed that contingency planning is the most useful part of the contract, because it 
learns the contract partners what problems they could encounter, what reasonable 
financial compensations are to be paid when they do occur, and how to minimise the 
likelihood that these problems will occur. One of the main purposes of e3-value+ is to 
support this contingency planning process in contract negotiations. 
 
 
Figure 2: Modelling Violated Obligations In e3-value+ 
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Compared to Figure 1, in Figure 2 we now have two additional value exchanges between 
the buyer and the seller, which represent two possible sub-ideal situations: (1) the seller 
delivers goods, and the buyer does not pay, and (2) the seller does not deliver goods, 
while the buyer pays. The first is the bad behaviour of the buyer, and the second is the 
bad behaviour of the seller. As a result, instead of one scenario path in the ideal situation 
in Figure 1, we now have in Figure 2 three different alternatives, modelled as one ideal 
and two sub-ideal paths coming out of the OR-fork. In addition, we also added weights to 
each of the path segments. These weights reflect the severeness of the violation. For 
example, the buyer can face three situations: to pay and to receive goods, to receive goods 
and not pay, and to pay, but not to receive goods. The worst option for the buyer is to 
receive goods, but not to pay, because then the buyer violates his/her obligation to pay. 
By assigning a higher weight to the segment, which indicates the worst case for the buyer, 
the incentive is modelled for the buyer not to take this sub-ideal path.  
As for the exchanges between the seller and the tax administration, the ideal situation is 
modelled as the seller paying tax and the tax administration confirming a legal 
compliance. In the sub-ideal situation the principal of reciprocity can only be violated by 
not paying tax (we assume that a tax office cannot violate it by punishing the seller even 
if the tax is paid). Note that the violations of obligations in exchanges between the seller 
and the tax administration are independent of violations of obligations between the seller 
and the buyer, and the other way around. The model includes a number of possible sub-
ideal paths: (a) the goods are delivered, the fee is not paid, and the tax is paid, (b) the 
goods are not delivered, the fee is paid, and the tax is paid, (c) the goods are delivered, 
the fee is not paid, and the tax is not paid, (d) the goods are not delivered, the fee is paid, 
and the tax is not paid, and (e) the goods are delivered, and the fee is paid, but the tax is 
not paid. Below we describe the extensions of e3-value in more detail. 
Extension 1: the violation of the principle of reciprocity.  
The ideal situation between the buyer and the seller is represented by value exchanges 
denoting transfers of goods and fees between them. We model a sub-ideal situation as a 
violation of the principle of economic reciprocity. The failure to deliver a value object is 
the violation of the principle of reciprocity. In e3-value the principle of reciprocity is 
“hard-wired”, and the violation of the principle of reciprocity will be reflected in the 
changes of the following e3-value concepts: 
Value Interface. A value interfaces consists of groups of in-going and out-going value 
ports. It shows the value object an actor is willing to exchange in return for another value 
object via its ports. The failure to deliver value object results in an incomplete set of value 
exchanges coming out and in the value interface. 
Value port. Value object is exchanged between actors via value ports of the value 
interface. If the principle of reciprocity is violated, no value object and no value exchange 
goes through the value port. We call this value port an empty value port.  
Value object. The violation the principle of reciprocity results in new types of value 
objects. Basically, there are two types of value objects: delivered value object and non-
delivered value object. 
Value exchange. Value exchange is closely related to value interface, and the violation of 
the principal of reciprocity will result in a value exchange that it is not executed. Thus, 
there are also two types of value exchanges: executed value exchanges and non-
executed value exchanges. 
To graphically represent the violation of the principle of reciprocity we use different 
representations of value exchanges. Executed value exchanges are represented with solid 
lines, and non-executed ones with dashed lines. The value ports that are connected to 
non-executed value exchanges are empty. The names of non-delivered value objects are 
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also changed depending on the corresponding delivered value objects (like, “Payment” 
for the delivered value object and “No Payment” for the non-delivered one).  
Extension 2: weights of value ports, path segments, and sub-paths. 
We modelled five violation situations, but they are not of the same severeness. For 
example, one can argue that even if the buyer did not pay the seller for the delivered 
goods, for the seller it is still better to pay tax rather than not to pay tax, because VAT is 
based on the seller’s invoice and not on whether the seller actually received the payment 
from the buyer. 
The idea of differentiating between levels of severeness of sub-ideal situations was 
proposed by Tan & Thoen (1998), and Raskin et.al. (1996). Following the suggested 
solution, we propose to model the difference between violations by assigning different 
weights to segments that lead to empty value ports. Weights represent fines: the higher 
the weight, the more severe the violation. Every segment leading to a non-empty value 
port has a zero weight, because there is no violation of the terms of the contract, and 
therefore no fine is assigned. Every segment leading to an empty value port has a non-
zero positive weight, which reflects a kind of sub-ideal behaviour that is fined with a 
penalty. Note that weights are assigned only to segments leading to value ports having 
outgoing value objects: the assumption is made that the failure to deliver the value object 
is a responsibility of the party that offers this object, not the party that accepts it.  
For example, in Figure 2 in the exchange between the buyer and the seller when the 
goods are delivered (value object “Goods”) and the fee is not paid (value object “No 
Payment”), a non-zero positive weight (in this case 10), is assigned to the segment 
leading to the empty outgoing value port with the non-delivered value object “No 
Payment”. Similarly, the segments leading to empty outgoing value ports with the 
associated non-delivered objects “No Goods”, and “No VAT” have non-zero positive 
weights 10 and 2 respectively.  
Assigning weights is part of the modelling process, just as the introduction of sub-ideal 
paths is. The e3-value+ methodology does not prescribe the contract partners which sub-
ideal paths are relevant to consider, or which specific numbers have to be assigned to a 
weight. These are modelling issues that contract partners have to agree upon among each 
other. However, e3-value+ does help to structure this modelling process. 
To keep things simple we use absolute numbers in this paper to explain the method. Of 
course, these weights are rather arbitrary. In typical contract negotiations the contract 
partners agree among each other how to assign these weights (and typically translate 
these weights in financial compensations). For example, the seller might require that in 
case of late payment the buyer should pay a certain percentage extra on top of the sales 
price. A more sophisticated representation could be to use a partial ordering of all the 
weights rather than absolute numbers. This partial ordering will be investigated in future 
research. 
The path can be assigned a total weight, which is a sum of weights of the segments that 
the path consists of. In assigning weights in Figure 2 we used the following heuristics: the 
more serious a violation is, the higher weight is assigned to the corresponding segment. 
Consequently, in the ideal scenario the total weight of a path will be zero. In sub-ideal 
situations the total weight of a path will be a non-zero positive number; we call these 
paths sub-ideal paths.  
The total weight expresses, how good or bad it is for the actor to execute a specific path. 
Having weights assigned to segments it is possible to distinguish the severeness of 
violation from the viewpoint of every single actor in the model. Table 2 represents five 
sub-ideal paths of Figure 2. The last three columns include the actors. Each actor in each 
sub-ideal situation accumulates weights, which are assigned to the individual segments. 
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Table 1: Actor’s View On Modelling Severeness Of Violation Weights For Different Sub-
Ideal Situations  
 
Non-delivered value objects 
Sub-ideal path 
Buyer Seller Tax administration 
a) The goods are delivered, the 
fee is not paid, and the tax is 
paid 
No Payment 
(w=10) w = 0 w = 0 
b) The goods are not delivered, 
the fee is paid, and the tax is 
paid 
w = 0 No Goods  (w=10) w = 0 
c) The goods are delivered, the 




No VAT  
(w = 2) w = 0 
d) The goods are not delivered, 
the fee is paid, and the tax is not 
paid 
w = 0 No Goods (w=10) No VAT (w =2) w = 0 
e) The goods are delivered, and 
the fee is paid, but the tax is not 
paid 
w = 0 No VAT (w = 2) w = 0 
 
For example, the “No Payment” value object is assigned to the buyer, because the value 
interface with outgoing value object “No Payment” belongs to the buyer, notifying that 
the buyer did not pay (see Figure 2). Consequently, we can say that for the buyer sub-
ideal situations (a) and (c) are the worst because they have the highest weights 10, while 
other paths are equal to the path of the ideal situation. Similarly, for the seller, the worst 
sub-ideal situation is (d): it has the highest total weight 12 (no goods are delivered and no 
tax is paid). The situation (c), when the buyer did not pay for the goods, and the seller did 
not pay taxes, is worse for the buyer than for the seller: the buyer accumulates the weight 
10, while the seller has only 2. For the tax administration every modelled situation is 
equal to ideal: the tax administration is modelled as a governing institution that cannot be 
punished for violation of obligations. 
5 Conclusions 
In this paper we have introduced the e3-value+ design methodology, which is an 
extension of the e3-value methodology for designing business models for virtual network 
organisations. The e3-value+ design methodology is being developed, in particular, for 
modelling inter-organisational control mechanisms. The e3-value+ methodology supports 
both the analysis of violations of obligations as well as the corresponding design of 
control mechanisms to minimise the likelihood of these violations. The fine systems, 
described in this paper, can be considered as an incentive for actors not to misbehave, and 
hence as a type of control mechanism. This methodology supports the contingency 
planning phase of contract drafting, because it helps the contract partners to understand 
what violations of contractual obligations they could encounter, what reasonable financial 
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compensations are to be paid when they do occur, and how to minimise the likelihood 
that these problems will occur.  
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